Tunisia’s Counterterrorism Efforts – Counterproductive?

Often hailed as the success story of the Arab Spring, Tunisia’s democratic transition has encountered many challenges since 2011 including political assassinations, an attack on the U.S embassy, violent mass protests and terrorism, targeting government security forces, the military, civilians and tourists.  The latter in particular has received attention as statistics show that the greatest numbers of foreign fighters in Daesh or the Islamic State are Tunisians with over 6000 currently in Syria and Iraq and more than 5000 prevented from leaving Tunisia to join.  In addition, the Interior Ministry estimates over 700 have returned to Tunisia, with hundreds more entering undetected via Libya.  Though it cannot be said that all foreign fighters are, or will become terrorists, a strategy vacuum for rehabilitation and integration makes this more likely.  (Byman 2015)

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has issued guidance for states on criminal justice responses to terrorism through the publication of a handbook.  Whilst acknowledging the need for change to adapt to the specific challenges that terrorism presents through new legislation, policy and procedures, it is absolute that this should not be at the expense of fundamental human rights.  The absence of a definition of terrorism under international law has enabled states such as Tunisia to create their own wide definitions, leading to questionable practices such as the ‘mass arrest’ of more than 1000 individuals in the aftermath of the Bardo and Sousse attacks in 2015.

The government’s response to the threat of terrorism under the leadership of President Essebsi has been controversial, from its prevention strategies to its law enforcement methods.  As such, there have been numerous calls from human rights groups about the need to respect basic rights in the pursuit of security, and in the management and minimisation of terror.  (Blank 2015)

Tunisians have been living under almost constant State of Emergency conditions since the Sousse attack in 2015.  Curfews have been imposed, large gatherings prohibited and additional powers have been given to the government regarding control of the media.  The conviction that ‘curtailed civil liberties’ are fully restored once security has returned becomes problematic when the status quo is emergency.  (Posner 2016)

During the same period, a new counterterrorism law was introduced which increased security services monitoring and surveillance powers, extended the holding period for arrested suspects from 6 days to 15, accepted closed courts and witness anonymity and introduced the death penalty for attacks which resulted in death. 

According to Amnesty International in Tunisia 15,000 people have been affected by travel restrictions; who have no access to the information regarding their ban and therefore no pathway to appeal the decision.  Restrictions on travel are seen as one of the key tools in preventing international terrorism. (UNODC)  Fighters who were successful in overcoming travel restrictions pose a potential national security threat on their return home as they are likely to be trained in using weapons and to use violence locally and/or regionally as well as acting as recruiters. (Byman 2015) 

Religion is often cited as the motivation of terrorists whilst neglecting the variety of other influencing factors.  (Crenshaw 2007) The main target of the security services in Tunisia is the Salafist community, leading to increased tensions between citizens and the government who feel their right to religious freedom is being attacked.  (Byman 2015)  High unemployment rates, marginalisation of young people and in particular those living in poorer rural areas of the country are all cited as influential factors in the rise of extremism. 

Research shows that even after the revolution there remains a high level of public mistrust of institutions, particularly the security services.   It would therefore be short-sighted of both legislators and policy makers to exacerbate this through the unequivocal prioritisation of security before human rights.  History shows that religiously motivated terror groups take considerably longer to end in comparison to other kinds of groups.  (Jones & Libicki 2008) Should Islamic State follow this trend, then Tunisia’s $255 million USD budget for counterterrorism may be conservative.  (Africa Research Bulletin 2016)

      

Refugee Protection; Pledges and Perilous Pathways

Between January and May of this year there were 2243 migrant deaths in the Mediterranean Sea as they attempted to reach Europe, an increase of 34% based on the same period in 2015. Despite these figures, state and media security discourse around the refugee crisis has mostly focused on EU borders and citizens and less so on the security of the people risking their lives on boats, the majority of whom are Syrian refugees. (Perkowski 2016) According to UNHCR, ‘At this rate 2016 will be the deadliest year on record in the Mediterranean sea.’

UNHCR is the organisation that has a legal obligation concerned with the protection of refugees including their ‘physical security’.  In 2015 it launched the ‘Special Mediterranean Initiative’ in response to the growing numbers of deaths.  In cooperation with EU member states, African and Middle Eastern states, the initiative proposes several actions including expanding ‘access to solutions’ through the creation of resettlement opportunities and other safe and legal avenues to Europe.  However states have moved ‘painfully slowly’ in fulfilling their commitments and have been accused of drawing back support in light of the ‘one in one out’ deal with Turkey.   The deal means that for every refugee (who has entered Europe illegally) in Greece that is returned to Turkey, Europe will resettle a Syrian refugee currently in Turkey who has not tried to enter Europe illegally, thus incentivising the use of legal avenues.  Critics are sceptical of both its legality and likelihood for success.

As Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan struggle to cope with the numbers of Syrian refugees even with EU funding, the preference of states to offer humanitarian aid far from their own borders as opposed to offering resettlement opportunities is highly apparent.  (Cuellar 2006) At the end of 2015 it was announced that Turkey alone will receive 3 billion euros from EU institutions and states to help 800,000 Syrian refugees within its borders but whether or not that will be enough to stem the flow of boats in the Mediterranean remains to be seen.  It won’t deter people trying to enter Europe via Italy’s shores from North Africa.

A small coalition of churches and NGOs in Italy has opted to directly intervene and create ‘humanitarian corridors’ to provide safe and legal passage to Syrian refugees via flights to Europe in a scheme that successfully piloted in February 2016 and is now being considered by governments such as Switzerland.  The project which also supports the integration of the refugees has been welcomed by the Italian government which has incurred none of the associated costs, raising questions about the responsibilities of states. 

Nicole Ostrand makes 3 recommendations regarding enhanced security for Syrian refugees beyond the neighbouring countries, all of which are focused on increasing opportunities for safe and legal movement.  They are largely in line with the UNHCR recommendations however there is an additional suggestion that refugees should be able to apply for protection through developed states embassies in the neighbouring countries. (Ostrand 2015)

However this seems unrealistic due to the lack of political will amongst European states, particularly in a time of rising xenophobia and the success of right-wing anti-immigration parties to resettle refugees.  (Hammerstad 2000) UNHCR efforts to reduce the numbers of refugees attempting to enter Europe via the Mediterranean and increase state resettlement quotas are limited due to its funding dependency from those very governments.  (Cuellar 2006)  Perhaps the Italian ‘Corridoi Umanitari’ initiative’s success derives from its non-governmental funding sources, a replication by the Swiss government may offer more insight.

In the meantime the desperation of refugees and migrants to reach Europe outweighs the fear of the perilous journey they must make to get there.